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Abstract
In this paper, we study efficiency in truthful auctions via a social net-
work, where a seller can only spread the information of an auction to the
buyers through the buyers’ network. In single-item auctions, we show that
no mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational, efficient, and weakly
budget balanced. In addition, we propose α-APG mechanisms, a class of
mechanisms which operate a trade-off between efficiency and weakly budget
balancedness. In multi-item auctions, there already exists a strategy-proof
mechanism when all buyers need only one item. However, we indicate a
counter-example to strategy-proofness in this mechanism, and to the best of
our knowledge, the question of finding a strategy-proof mechanism remains
open. We assume that all buyers have decreasing marginal utility and pro-
pose a generalized APG mechanism that is strategy-proof and individually
rational but not efficient. Importantly, we show that this mechanism achieves
the largest efficiency measure among all strategy-proof mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Imagine that an auction will take place. Until it starts, the auctioneer wants to
spread information about it to all the people who might have interest in the goods
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being sold. Firms might pay a lot for advertising before auctions occur. Many
social network services (SNSs) allow connections among people who can spread
advertisements. Many researchers have investigated advertisements and such so-
cial networks, e.g., Emek et al. (2011), Borgatti et al. (2009), Jackson (2010), and
Kempe et al. (2003). In this situation, the auctioneer may assume that those who
read the advertisements will spread such information through their SNSs. How-
ever, they may be reluctant because they themselves can benefit from fewer partic-
ipants at the auction. If the auctioneer wants the participants to spread the word
about the auction, he has to incentivize them to distribute it to their neighbors.
Since standard auction theory has not studied such auctions with a network of
buyers, results are scant about auction advertisements through a buyers’ network.
To the best of our knowledge, Li et al. (2017) is the first paper that deals with
this issue. They generalize a classical single-item auction to one with a social net-
work, which consist of all buyers and a seller who is located somewhere in the net-
work but is restricted from directly spreading the information to all the buyers. The
authors assume that all the buyers only get information through the network and
analyzed two well-known mechanisms, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anism (Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)) and the Information Dif-
fusion Mechanism. They extended these two mechanisms to auctions via a social
network and prove that they are strategy-proof, where no buyer has an incentive to
untruthfully report their valuation OR to prevent the information from being spread
to their neighbors. They also prove that the VCG mechanism is efficient but not
weakly budget balanced, that is, the seller’s revenue can be negative, and the In-
formation Diffusion Mechanism is weakly budget balanced but not efficient. Zhao
et al. (2018) also study such auctions, generalize the Information Diffusion Mech-
anism proposed by Li et al. (2017), and show that the Generalized Information
Diffusion Mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational, and weakly budget
balanced. However, in this paper we show a counter-example to strategy-proofness
in this mechanism.
The following are our results. Our model of auctions via a social network is
almost the same as the one analyzed in these above two papers. In single-item auc-
tions, we prove that no mechanism is strategy-proof, individually rational, weakly
budget balanced, and efficient. In other words, under classical criteria, the seller’s
revenue might be negative if she sells the item to the buyer with the largest valu-
ation. We propose for a single-item auction α-APG mechanisms, which is a class
of mechanisms which operate a trade-off between efficiency and weakly budget
balancedness. In multi-item auctions, we indicate a counter-example to strategy-
proofness in the Generalized Information Diffusion Mechanism proposed by Zhao
et al. (2018). In addition, we analyze efficiency in multi-item auctions with de-
creased marginal utility. The assumption that buyers have decreasing marginal
utility is quite common in economics. We propose the Generalized APG Mecha-
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nism, which is strategy-proof and individually rational, and prove that it achieves
the largest efficiency measure among all strategy-proof mechanisms, where the
efficiency measure is the worst-case ratio of the social surplus achieved by the
mechanism to the optimal social surplus.
The following is the main difference between the Generalized Information Dif-
fusion Mechanism (or the Information Diffusion Mechanism) and our approach.
An important concept for the two Information Diffusion Mechanisms is a critical
diffusion node that shares the information with a buyer who can only get it through
the node. Unlike these two mechanisms, an important concept for our mechanisms
is the Aligned Path Graph (APG), which is comprised of social networks and pri-
oritizes each buyer. This graph simplifies our mechanisms.
The following papers are related to ours. Edelman et al. (2007) investigate
generalized second price auctions for the market of internet advertisements. Al-
though its mechanism greatly benefits companies like Google and has some in-
teresting properties, truth-telling is not an equilibrium in it. We focus on truth-
telling. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) study a mechanism design setting where
each agent can acquire information about the state of the world before she joins.
In contrast, we study a mechanism design setting where each agent can spread the
information about an auction’s existence. Kempe et al. (2003) analyze a social net-
work where ideas and influence propagate. Their main question is how to choose
a set of targeted individuals. Although we have a similar issue concerning how to
spread information, we examine auctions.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes a model of auc-
tions and gives definitions. In Section 3, we analyze a single-item auction via
a social network. In Section 4, we analyze the multi-item auction, indicate the
counter-example, and describe the Generalized APG mechanism. In Section 5, we
conclude.
2 Model
Consider a set of buyers, N = {1, . . . , n}, and the seller s who wants to sell k
identical items. For each i ∈ N∪{s}, s/he can tell the information to the neighbors
Ri ⊆ N \ {i}, and each buyer has their valuation profile vi = (vi,1, vi,2, . . . , vi,k),
where vi,1 ≥ vi,2 ≥ · · · ≥ vi,k ≥ 0 on the items. Namely, the buyers have
decreasing marginal utility on the items. Define the type of buyer i as θi = (vi, Ri).
We assume that all buyers can declare their type θ′i = (v′i, R′i), s.t. R′i ⊆ Ri, i.e., we
assume buyer i can choose not to send the information to some of her neighbors,
but she cannot pretend to send the information to non-neighbors. This is because
we assume that each buyer can tell the information to the buyers whom they know,
and if they know buyers, they can tell the information to the buyers. We assume
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that buyer i gets the information if and only if there is a sequence from s to i,
(i0, i1, . . . , il), where il′+1 ∈ R′il′ for any l′ = 0, . . . , l − 1, i0 = s, and il = i. Let
Θi denote a set of all possible types i can declare, letΘ denote Πi∈NΘi, and letΘ−i
denote Πj∈N\{i}Θj . Define G as the directed graph (N ∪ {s}, E), where N ∪ {s}
is a set of nodes, and E = {(i, j) ∈ N ∪ {s} ×N | j ∈ R′i} is a set of edges. Let
θ′ = (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
n) denote the profile of all buyers’ declared types. We use standard
notations: θ′−i is a profile of the buyers’ declared types except for i, (θ′i,θ′−i) is
a profile of the buyers’ declared types where i declares θ′i and the other buyers
declare θ′−i. A mechanismM is a pair of allocation function fi : Θ → Z≥0 and
payment function pi,l : Θ→ R for all i ∈ N and all l = 0, . . . , k. fi is the number
of the items buyer i gets, and pi,l is a payment of the l-th item for buyer i. When a
buyer i gets k′ items, the utility of the buyer is
∑k′
l=1(vi,l−pi,l), and when the buyer
cannot get the item, i’s utility is pi,0. Namely, we assume a standard quasi-linear
utility model, and we write the utility of buyer i as uMi (θi,θ′−i) when i’s type is
θi and the other buyers declare θ′−i under a mechanismM. We focus on feasible
mechanisms: for any θ′ ∈ Θ,
• ∑i∈N fi(θ′) ≤ k
• fi(θ′) = pi,l(θ′) = 0 for any i ∈ N and any l = 0, . . . , k if buyer i does not
get the information.
The second item means that the buyers who do not get the information cannot
participate in the auction. The convention is that these buyers declare a type.
First of all, we will define strategy-proofness of a mechanism:
Definition 1. A mechanism is strategy-proof if and only if uMi ((vi, Ri),θ′−i) ≥
uMi ((v
′
i, R
′
i),θ
′−i) for any (vi, Ri), (v′i, R′i) ∈ Θi s.t. R′i ⊆ Ri and any θ′−i ∈ Θ−i.
This strategy-proofness means that not only telling a lie about their valuation
but also stopping the information to their neighbors does not benefit for all buyers.
Secondly, we will define individual rationality of a mechanism:
Definition 2. A mechanism is individually rational if and only if uMi (θi,θ′−i) ≥ 0
for any θi ∈ Θi and any θ′−i ∈ Θ−i.
This means that the utility of each buyer is not smaller than 0 for any declaration
of the other buyer when the buyer tells the truth. Thirdly, we will define a efficiency
measure:
Definition 3. A mechanism has a competitive ratio of α for efficiency (in short, is
α-efficient) if and only if
α = min
θ′∈Θ
∑
i∈N
∑fi(θ′)
l=1 vi,l
maxf ′∈F
∑
i∈N
∑f ′i(θ′)
l=1 vi,l
,
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Figure 1: Aligned Path Graph (APG)
where F is a set of all feasible allocation rules.
This is a standard measurement to what extent the mechanism achieves effi-
ciency, as Procaccia and Tennenholtz (2013) propose. This efficiency measure is
the worst-case ratio of the social surplus the mechanism achieves to the optimal
social surplus. α is in the interval [0, 1] by definition, and the mechanism which is
0-efficient is the worst from the viewpoint of efficiency. The mechanism which is
1-efficient is the best, and in this case, we call that the mechanism is efficient.
Finally, we will inductively define a path graph P , where one of the end points
is the seller, and the next buyer of a buyer (or the seller) is the one with the youngest
number among the remaining buyers who have the shortest distance from the seller
underG. This is the Aligned Path Graph (APG). LetP closei be a set of buyers closer
than i to the seller, let P fari be a set of buyers farther away than i, and let lPi be
the distance between the seller and i under P . Figure 1 represents how to make an
APG. The number in each circle is assigned to each buyer. The top graph represents
G. The closest buyers to the seller in G are buyers 1 and 6. Then, buyer 1 is the
closest in APG, and buyer 6 is the second closest. The second closest buyers to
the seller in G are buyers 3 and 5. Then, buyer 3 is the third closest in APG, and
buyer 6 is the fourth closest. The third closest buyers to the seller in G are buyers
2 and 4. Then, buyer 2 is the fifth closest in APG, and buyer 4 is the sixth closest.
3 Mechanisms for single-item auctions
In this section, we will consider single-item auctions. We write pi as pi,1 when
buyer i gets an item and pi,0 when buyer i gets no item in this section. We assume
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the largest valuation is bounded, i.e., for any θi = (vi, Ri) ∈ Θi, vi ≤ v∗ holds in
this section. Before defining our mechanism, we will mention two mechanisms,
Information Diffusion Mechanism (IDM) and the VCG Mechanism (VCG). In auc-
tions via the social network, IDM and the VCG are proposed in Li et al. (2017);
and prove that both are strategy-proof and individually rational. In addition, they
prove that the seller’s revenue can be negative in the VCG and propose IDM as a
mechanism in which the seller’s revenue is always non-negative.
We will define β-weakly budget balancedness (β-WBB), which is the ratio of
the worst revenue in the VCG to the worst revenue in a mechanism.
Definition 4. A mechanism is β-WBB if and only if
β = 1 + min
θ′∈Θ
∑
i∈N pi(θ
′)
(n− 1)v∗ .
Note that for the VCG, β = 0, i.e., in the worst-case, each buyer except the
winner gets side-payment that is v∗, while the winner pays nothing. If β ≥ 1, the
revenue in a mechanism is not negative. If β ≥ 1, we just say that the mechanism
is WBB. As we state, IDM is WBB, and the VCG is 0-WBB. In fact, efficiency
is inconsistent with WBB under some basic criteria, as the following proposition
states, and Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) show in the context of bilateral trad-
ing. Let v∗S be the largest declared valuation among S ⊆ N .
Proposition 1. There is no mechanism which is strategy-proof, individually ratio-
nal, efficient, and weakly budget balanced.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
This proposition gives the first axiomatic analysis for auctions via a social net-
work, and this result complements the results by Li et al. (2017).
Next; we will propose a class of mechanisms which operate a trade-off between
efficiency and weakly budget balancedness in the sense that it is α-efficient and
(1 − α)-WBB, where α ∈ (0, 1). We call this class the α-APG mechanisms.
Define the mechanism ({fi}i∈N , {pi}i∈N) as follows:
fi(θ
′) =
1 if i = arg minj∈M l
P
j ,
0 otherwise,
and
pi(θ
′) =

v∗
P closei
if i = w and v∗
P closei
< αv∗
P fari
, (Group 1)
−αv∗N + v∗P closei if i ∈ P
close
w , (Group 2)
v∗
Pclose
i
α
if i = w and v∗
P closei
≥ αv∗
P fari
, (Group 3)
0 if i ∈ P farw , (Group 4)
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where M = {i ∈ N | v′i ≥ αv∗N}, and w is the winner. The winner of the
mechanism is the closest buyer to the seller in APG whose valuation is not α times
smaller than the maximum valuation. The payment is different for a classification
of buyers because the threshold of a buyer’s declared valuation to get the item is
different. As we will show, the sum of the payment when a buyer gets the item
and the payment when the buyer does not equals the threshold, which is implied
in Myerson (1981).
We will examine properties of the mechanism.
Theorem 1. The α-APG mechanisms is α-efficient, (1 − α)-WBB, individually
rational, and strategy-proof.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
By this theorem, we can say that more efficient mechanisms have less WBB in
our class of the mechanisms.
4 Mechanism for multi-item auctions
In this section, we will consider multi-item auctions. First of all, we will show a
counter-example to strategy-proofness in Generalized IDM proposed by Zhao et al.
(2018), which is tailored to the multi-item auctions when all buyers need only one
item. The summary of the GIDM is as follows. First of all, the seller sends items
to its direct descendants, where the number of items each descendant receives is
equal to the number of top k buyers in the sub-tree. When buyer i, who is not
within top k winners, receives an item/items, she can take away an item from her
descendant, if she is willing to pay a certain price. The price is determined such
that each buyer has no incentive to misreport her valuation. More specifically, the
price is equal to the decreased amount of social surplus caused by allocating an
item to the buyer. Here, the social surplus is calculated such that the allocation of
a buyer who takes away an item, as well as the allocation of each of top k buyers,
who is not taken away an item, are fixed.1.
Consider the graph in Figure 2. The seller s is in the top-left corner, and the
number above or beside each circle is the true valuation of each buyer. We assume
that there are 4 items. Let us examine the incentive for buyer d.
1We found that GIDM described in Zhao et al. (2018) is not strategy-proof. We contacted one
of the authors. He admits there is some description errors and suggests a revision. Our description
here is based on his revision. More specifically, the constraints in both the allocation rule and
the payment rule must be revised. One of the constraints is ∀j ∈ Nouti , pij(θ′) = 0. Replace the
constraint to the following: ∀j ∈ Nopt \ {Nouti ∪Di}, pij(θ′) = 1. Here, we show the fact that
GIDM is not strategy-proof even after this revision.
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Figure 2: Example: GIDM is not strategy-proof
First, let us assume all buyers act truthfully. Then, 4 items are sent to buyer a
(since c, d, e, and g are top-4 buyers). Then, buyer a takes away an item from buyer
c (whose valuation is smallest). Next, buyer b receives remaining 3 items and takes
away an item from buyer e, and sends one item to buyer c (as well as to buyer g).
Then, buyer c takes away one item from d. Here, the price of c is equal to 3. This
is because assuming the assignments of buyers a and b (who take away items) are
fixed, the best way for allocating remaining two items is allocating them to c and d.
If we do not allocate an item to c, the best way to allocating remaining two items
is allocating them to f and g. Thus, the decreased amount of social surplus except
c is 3. Thus, buyer d cannot obtain an item and her utility is 0.
Next, let us assume buyer d stops spreading the information. Then, 3 items
are sent to buyer a (since c, d, and g are top-4 buyers), while one item is sent to
buyer f . Then, buyer a takes away an item from buyer c. Next, buyer b receives
remaining 2 items and takes away an item from buyer g, and sends one item to
buyer c. However, in this case, buyer c cannot take away an item, since her price
becomes 6. This is because assuming the assignments of buyers a, b, and f are
fixed, the best way for allocating remaining one item is allocating it to g. If the
item is allocated to c instead, the social surplus except c decreases by 6. Thus,
buyer c does not take away an item and sends it to buyer d. Buyer d obtains an
item and pays 6. Thus, her utility becomes positive by stopping the information.
This violates strategy-proofness.
A failure of the proof is on the bottom of the right column in page 7, where
they simply assert that stopping the information is never beneficial. Superficially,
this sounds plausible since if a buyer stops spreading the information, the number
of items sent toward her can never increase. However, our counter-example shows
that doing so is actually beneficial.
The above counter-example reveals that there is no existing strategy-proof mech-
anism which is tailored to multi-item auctions when all buyers need only one item.
Now, we will analyze wider range of multi-item auctions. We assume that buyers
may need multiple items and have decreasing marginal utility, as we defined in
Section 2. First of all, we will show an impossibility theorem. Let nk = b
√
kc and
let v∗(S, k′) be the k′-th largest declared valuation among S ⊆ N .
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Theorem 2. There is no mechanism which is strategy-proof and
(
nk
k
+ 
)
-efficient
for any  > 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Next; we will propose a mechanism that is nk
k
-efficient. Let vi,sum =
∑nk
l=1 vi,l
and v′i,sum =
∑nk
l=1 v
′
i,l. We call these nk-sum valuations. The winners are the
buyers who have the nk-sum valuation which is not smaller than the nk-th nk-sum
valuation. When there is a tie, younger buyers are prioritized. All the winners get
just nk items, and the remaining items are discarded. If a buyer i gets items, the
buyer pays v∗sum(P closei , nk), where v∗sum(S, k′) is the k′-thnk-sum valuation inS ⊆
N . If buyer i does not get any items, the buyer gets v∗sum(N, nk)−v∗sum(P closei , nk).
We call this the generalized APG mechanism (GAPG mechanism).
Now, we will address properties of the mechanism.
Theorem 3. The GAPG mechanism is strategy-proof and nk
k
-efficient.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Theorems 2 and 3 completely answer the question on the approximability of
strategy-proof mechanisms with decreasing marginal utility, i.e., Theorem 2 pro-
vides an upper bound of α, and Theorem 3 shows the bound is tight by providing
a strategy-proof mechanism that exactly achieves the upper bound. Additionally,
this mechanism is individually rational but neither WBB nor non-wasteful, that is,
there is an item no buyer gets.
On the other hand, when all buyers only require a single item, there exists a
efficient mechanism which is almost the same as GAPG. The payment rule of the
mechanism is completely the same as GAPG when nk = 1, and the winners are
just the top k buyers. We can easily show that the mechanism is efficient and
strategy-proof by the similar way to the proof of Theorem 3.
5 Concluding Remarks
We studied the extent to which a mechanism achieves efficiency in auctions via
a social network. In single-item auctions, there are two existing mechanisms, the
VCG and IDM, which Li et al. (2017) analyzed to show that the VCG is efficient but
not WBB, and IDM is WBB but not efficient. We propose theα-APG mechanisms,
a class of mechanisms which operate a trade-off between efficiency and weakly
budget balancedness. When this mechanism achieves a more efficient allocation,
it achieves less WBB.
Second, we indicated a counter-example to strategy-proofness in the GIDM
proposed by Zhao et al. (2018), which is tailored to multi-item auctions when all
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buyers need only one item. This increases the importance of our next contribution.
Third, we analyzed multi-item auctions with decreasing marginal utility and pro-
posed the generalized APG mechanism, which is nk
k
-efficient, strategy-proof, and
individually rational. We showed that no mechanism exists that is strategy-proof
and has the larger efficiency measure than the GAPG mechanism. In addition, this
mechanism is not weakly budget balanced. In multi-item auctions with decreasing
marginal utility, since no mechanisms have been proposed that are weakly bud-
get balanced and strategy-proof, future works will find such a mechanism. More-
over, the GAPG mechanism is not non-wasteful, so another important question is
to what extent a mechanism can achieve efficiency under strategy-proofness and
non-wastefulness.
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A Appendix
A.1 The proof of Proposition 1
Suppose for a contradiction that there exists such a mechanism. Fix i ∈ N and
θ′−i arbitrarily. First of all, assume that buyer i is the winner when i tells the truth
and spreads the information. By efficiency, vi ≥ v∗N−i , where N−i is a set of all
buyers without i. If buyer i tells the truth and spreads the information, the utility
of i is vi − pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri)). If i lies and reports v′i < v∗N−i , i’s utility is
− pi(θ′−i, (v′i, Ri)) ≤ vi − pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri))
⇔ − pi(θ′−i, (v′i, Ri)) + pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri)) ≤ vi.
Since the inequality holds for any vi ≥ v∗N−i ,
−pi(θ′−i, (v′i, Ri)) + pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri)) ≤ v∗N−i
because pi is constant except for v′i = v∗N−i . Similarly, since vi ≥ pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri))
by individual rationality,
v∗N−i ≥ pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri)).
Secondly, assume that buyer i is not the winner when i tells the truth and
spreads the information. Then, vi ≤ v∗N−i . If buyer i tells the truth and spreads the
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information, the utility of i is −pi(θ′, (vi, Ri)). If i lies and reports v′i > v∗N−i , the
utility is
vi − pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri)) ≤ −pi(θ′−i, (v′i, Ri))
⇔ vi ≤ −pi(θ′−i, (v′i, Ri)) + pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri)).
Since the inequality holds for any vi ≤ v∗N−i ,
v∗N−i ≤ −pi(θ′−i, (v′i, Ri)) + pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri)).
Then,
v∗N−i = −pi(θ′−i, (v′i, Ri)) + pi(θ′−i, (v′′i , Ri))
for any v′i < v∗N−i and any v
′′
i > v
∗
N−i .
Suppose an additional assumption that v∗N−i > 0, v
∗
N−i > vi > 0, and v
′
j = 0
for any other buyer j. Moreover, assume that the buyer whose valuation is v∗N−i
cannot get the information if i does not tell the information. In this case, when i
stops spreading the information, the utility is
vi − 0 ≤ −pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri)).
Then,
v∗N−i − 0 ≤ −pi(θ′−i, (vi, Ri)).
By the above discussion, if i tells the truth and spreads the information, the buyer
whose valuation is v∗N−i pays at most vi. As a result, the seller’s revenue is at most
vi − v∗N−i < 0 by individual rationality. By weakly budget balancedness, this is a
contradiction.
A.2 The proof of Theorem 1
Fix i ∈ N and θ′−i ∈ Θ′−i arbitrarily. We will show that for any θ′ ∈ Θ′,
the utility of i is maximized when i reports her type truthfully to prove strategy-
proofness. First of all, assume that buyer i is classified into Group 1 when i reports
her type truthfully. Then, vi ≥ αv∗N and v∗P closei < αv
∗
N . If i reports her type
truthfully, the utility of i is vi−v∗P closei which does not depend on θ
′
i. If imisreports
her type and is classified into Group 2, the utility of i is
αv∗N − v∗P closei ≤ vi − v
∗
P closei
by vi ≥ αv∗N . If i misreports her type and is classified into Group 3, the utility of
i is
vi −
v∗
P closei
α
≤ vi − v∗P closei
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by 0 < α < 1. If i misreports her type and is classified into Group 4, the utility
of i is 0 ≤ vi − v∗P closei because v
∗
P closei
< αv∗N ≤ vi. Therefore, i who is classified
into Group 1 when i tells the truth has no incentives to misreport her type.
Secondly, assume i is classified into Group 2 when i reports her type truthfully.
Then, vi < αv∗N and v∗P closei < αv
∗
N . If i reports her type truthfully, the utility of
i is αv∗N − v∗P closei , which does not depend on v
′
i because i does not report the
maximum value. In addition, if i diffuses the information to R′i ( Ri, the utility
does not increase because v∗N does not increase. Then, if imisreports her type and
is classified into Group 2, the utility does not increase. If imisreports her type and
is classified into Group 1, the utility of i is
vi − v∗P closei < αv
∗
N − v∗P closei
by vi < αv∗N . If i misreports her type and is classified into Group 3, the utility of
i is
vi −
v∗
P closei
α
≤ vi − v∗P closei < αv
∗
N − v∗P closei .
If i misreports her type and is classified into Group 4, the utility of i is
0 < αv∗N − v∗P closei
because v∗
P closei
< αv∗N . Therefore, i who is classified into Group 2 when i reports
her type truthfully, has no incentives to misreport her type.
Thirdly, assume i is classified into Group 3 when i reports her type truthfully.
Then, vi ≥ αv∗N and v∗P closei < αv
∗
N . In addition, i = m because i = w and
v∗
P closei
≥ αv∗
P fari
. Notice that i is classified into either Group 3 or Group 4 regard-
less what i reports. This is because if i does not spread the information, v∗
P closei
is
unchanged, and v∗
P fari
can decrease. If i tells the truth, the utility of i is vi−
v∗
Pclose
i
α
which does not depend on θ′i. If i misreports her type and is classified into Group
4, the utility of i is
0 < vi −
v∗
P closei
α
by v∗
P closei
< αv∗N = αvi. Therefore, iwho is classified into Group 3 when i reports
her type truthfully, has no incentives to misreport her type.
Finally, assume i is classified into Group 4 when i reports her type truthfully.
Then, v∗
P closei
≥ αv∗N . Since i 6= w, αvi ( ≤ v′w) ≤ v∗P closei . i is also classified
into either Group 3 or Group 4 even if i misreports her type. If i tells the truth,
the utility of i is 0 which does not depend on θ′i. If i misreports her type and is
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classified into Group 3, the utility of i is
vi −
v∗
P closei
α
≤ 0
by αvi ≤ v∗P closei . Therefore, i who is classified into Group 4 when i reports her
type truthfully, has no incentives to misreport her type. As a result, the α-APG
mechanisms is strategy-proof.
Next, we will prove individual rationality. If i is classified into Group 1, Group
2, or Group 4 when i tells the truth, the mechanism is obviously individually ra-
tional. Consider that i is classified into Group 3 when i tells the truth. Then,
v∗
P closei
< αvi by the above discussion about Group 3. Thus,
vi −
v∗
P closei
α
=
1
α
{
αvi − v∗P closei
}
> 0.
As a result, the α-APG mechanisms is individually rational.
By the definition of the mechanism, it is α-efficient. Then; we will show that
it is (1− α)-WBB and complete the proof. By its definition,∑i∈N pi(θ′) is min-
imized when v∗ = v∗N , and the graph G(θ) is a path graph. In this case,
1 + min
θ′∈Θ′
∑
i∈N pi(θ
′)
(n− 1)v∗ = 1−
(n− 1)αv∗N
(n− 1)v∗ = 1− α.
As a result, the α-APG mechanisms is (1− α)-WBB.
A.3 The proof of Theorem 2
Assume for a contradiction that there exists such a mechanism. First of all, we
will show that there is no buyer who gets k′ items, where nk ≥ k′ > 0. Suppose
for a contradiction that there exists such a buyer i for some θ′i and some θ′−i. If
v′i,1 = v
′
i,2 = · · · = v′i,k > k−nkk v∗(N \{i}, 1), buyer imust get more than nk items
by
(
nk
k
+ 
)
-efficiency. Then, assume that buyer i gets k′ items when i reports θ′i
and gets k′′ > nk items when i reports θ′′i .
We, first, assume that i’s type is θ′i. When buyer i tells the truth, the utility is∑k′
l=1{vi,l − pi,l}. When buyer i lies and gets k′′ items, the utility is
k′′∑
l=1
{vi,l − pi,l} ≤
k′∑
l=1
{vi,l − pi,l}
by strategy-proofness. Then,
k′′∑
l=k′
vi,l ≤
k′′∑
l=k′
pi,l.
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Then, there must be an upper bound of
∑k′′
l=k′ vi,l under the constraint that buyer i
gets k′ items by telling the truth because the mechanism is strategy-proof. Let ub
be the upper bound. We get ub ≤∑k′′l=k′ pi,l by strategy-proofness.
Next, assume that i’s type is θ′′i . When buyer i tells the truth, the utility is∑k′′
l=1{vi,l − pi,l}. When buyer i lies and gets k′ items, the utility is
k′∑
l=1
{vi,l − pi,l} ≤
k′′∑
l=1
{vi,l − pi,l}
by strategy-proofness. Then,
k′′∑
l=k′
vi,l ≥
k′′∑
l=k′
pi,l.
Let lb be the lower bound of
∑k′′
l=k′ vi,l under the constraint that buyer i gets k′ items
by telling the truth. Then; lb ≥∑k′′l=k′ pi,l holds by strategy-proofness. Therefore,
ub = lb =
∑k′′
l=k′ pi,l. Therefore, ub does not depend on i’s own valuations. Since
k−nk
k
v∗(N \ {i}, 1) ≥ ub = lb holds by (nk
k
+ 
)
-efficiency, ub = lb = 0 when
v∗(N \ {i}, 1) = 0. In addition, ub is not an increasing function of v∗(N \ {i}, 1)
because the buyer whose valuation is v∗(N \ {i}, 1) may only get the information
through i. Therefore, ub = lb = 0 for any θ′−i, which contradicts the existence of
a buyer who gets k′ items.
Then, all buyers who get some items get nk + 1 items or more. Then, the
number of winners is nk or fewer. Consider v1,1 = vn,1 > 0 and v1,l = vn,l = 0
for any l = 2, . . . , k. Then, this mechanism achieves
(
nk
k
)
-efficiency or less. This
is a contradiction.
A.4 The proof of Theorem 3
First of all, we will show its strategy-proofness. Fix i ∈ N and θ′−i ∈ Θ−i arbi-
trarily. We will show that buyer i has no incentives to lie or to stop spreading the
information. We, first, assume that buyer i gets nothing when the buyer tells the
truth. Then, vi,sum ≤ v∗sum(N, nk) and buyer i gets v∗sum(N, nk)−v∗sum(P closei , nk)
if i tells the truth and spreads the information. Notice that v∗sum(P closei , nk) does not
depend on Ri, and v∗sum(N, nk) decreases when buyer i does not spread the infor-
mation. Then, buyer i does not have incentives to stop spreading the information.
If buyer i lies and becomes a winner, the utility is
vi,sum − v∗sum(P closei , nk) ≤ v∗sum(N, nk)− v∗sum(P closei , nk)
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because vi,sum ≤ v∗sum(N, nk). Then, buyer i has no incentives to lie. Secondly,
assume that buyer i is a winner. Then, vi,sum ≥ v∗sum(N, nk). When i tells the
truth, the utility is
vi,sum − v∗sum(P closei , nk).
Notice that the utility does not depend on both v′i and R′i. Then, i does not have
incentives to stop spreading the information. If buyer i lies and becomes a loser,
the utility of buyer i is
v∗sum(N, nk)− v∗sum(P closei , nk) ≤ vi,sum − v∗sum(P closei , nk)
because vi,sum ≥ v∗sum(N, nk). As a result, the GAPG mechanism is strategy-
proof.
Secondly, we will show that the mechanism is nk
k
-efficient. Let vli,sum be the
l-th nk-sum valuation for any l = 1, . . . , n. Since vli,sum ≥ v∗(N, l) for any l =
1, . . . , nk, ∑nk
l=1 v
l
i,sum∑k
l=1 v
∗(N, l)
≥ nkv
nk
i,sum
nkv∗(N, nk) +
∑k
l=nk+1
v∗(N, l)
≥ nk
k
for any θ′. By Theorem 2, the GAPG mechanism is nk
k
-efficient.
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